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AARON WILDAVSKY, INCREMENTAL ISM, AND DEFENSE BUDGETING
A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
The crucial aspect of budgeting is whose preferences are to
prevail in disputes about .. .who shall receive budgetary benefits
and how much ?
Aaron Wildavsky
Political Implication of Budgetary Reform, 1961
Introduction
Aaron Wildavsky had an extremely broad set of interests in
social science and public policy. At the time of his death in
September of 1993, he had written or coauthored thirty books, with
several forthcoming, and one hundred eighty-six articles and book
chapters, with some additional papers awaiting publication. The
topics covered in this vast oeuvre of books and articles, in
unpublished casual papers, and in newspaper and magazine articles
too numerous to count, reveal the incredible spectrum of his
curiosity and knowledge. His work encompasses budgeting and fiscal
policy (domestic and international), political culture, community
power and leadership, risk analysis and safety, environmental
policy, the American Presidency, Presidential elections, American
diplomacy, U.S oil and gas policy, the art and craft of policy
analysis, policy implementation, how to conduct research,
academic collaboration, the development and evolution of the social
sciences, political and religious philosophy, Moses and Joseph as
leaders and administrators, the politics of religion, the
experience of his father as a youth in Poland, academic leadership
and administration, communism and morality, the Declaration of
Independence and the Articles of Confederation, and more... much
more. To say that Aaron was a profound thinker and prolific writer
runs the risk of understatement.
In this large body of material, Wildavsky wrote or coauthored
nine books and forty articles and book chapters on budgeting and
fiscal policy. It is this work that is reviewed selectively here.
A bibliography of Wildavsky' s work on budgeting and fiscal policy
is provided at the conclusion of this essay. Any attempt to survey
the totality of Aaron's writing would surely require a book rather
than an essay. Furthermore, we have focused our review on
approximately a dozen of the forty-eight pieces within the
Wildavsky portfolio on budgeting, taxing and spending
concentrating on those pieces in which he and his collaborators
made the most significant contribution to knowledge in the field in
our view. Our selection is, of course, subjective and we yield in
advance to criticism that we have not included all that should be
covered, or that we may have misinterpreted the significance of
some of the material we include. Inevitably, every student of
budgeting and of Wildavsky is entitled to select his or her own
list of greatest works and to interpret them in other ways and from
other perspectives.
Initially, one is humbled both by the volume and breadth of
Wildavsky' s contributions. A deeper reading reinforces this
impression, and enables the reader to delineate the themes that
Aaron and his collaborators worked on creatively for over three
decades. To discover this continuity is not to say that he and his
coworkers did not find anything new over this time. The opposite is
the case; Aaron was perpetually curious and driven to investigate
and understand every new twist and turn of budgetary process and
politics. In fact, he was the quintessential student of budgetary
politics, and his quest to understand and interpret appeared only
to be near an end less than one year before his death when he
mentioned to colleagues that he had written everything he cared to
say about budgeting. Of course, he said essentially the same thing
in his book Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes
published in 1975. 1
Defense Budgeting
Aaron Wildavsky's research and writing shaped how students and
scholars viewed budgeting for more than three decades, but his
early work virtually ignored defense budgeting because it was a
special case 2 . Wildavsky was not unaware of defense. It should be
noted that Wildavsky interrupted his undergraduate career to serve
two years in the U.S. Army beginning in the summer of 1950 during
the Korean conflict. In any case, there is no chapter on defense in
the original Politics of the Budgetary Process where Wildavsky's
theory of budgeting as incremental behavior is unveiled.
Subsequently, however, defense insiders told him that the
systematic interactions he had described outside of defense also
existed inside defense budgeting. Consequently, in The New Politics
of the Budgetary Process there is a substantial chapter on defense
budgeting 3 and like most of Wildavsky's writings it is both elegant
and insightful
.
Wildavsky notes that there are differences between defense and
non-defense budgeting. Defense budget totals are an instrument of
foreign policy and other nations react to changes in those totals,
just as we do to their defense spending changes. When some other
great power suddenly changes its defense allocation from 5 to 10%
of gnp, if it is a potential competitor to our interests, or to the
interests of our allies or potential allies, we must decide how
that increase will affect our own defense spending. Will we have
enough trained personnel, ships, and planes, maintenance items, and
all the other things that go into readiness and sustainability to
counter this change in the level of threat? Money buys capability.
More capability means an increased ability to do damage to others
who then must counter that increased ability with increases of
their own, or find strategic alliances to negate that threat. Other
nations do not monitor the total amount the U.S. spends on
education or health, or if they do, it does not have the same
salience for them that defense spending does. Defense budgeting is
about meeting threats that will exist in the future and shifts in
funding are early warnings that the threat scenario is about to
change and responses to it must also change. Thus Wildavsky
observes one difference with defense is that totals alone mean
something
.
There are other differences. Defense makes up about 70% of
discretionary spending. So much has been put into entitlements and
mandatories that for a Congressman to get anything for his district
means that the defense budget is one of the few discretionary pots
of money that can be raided for projects for his or her district.
It is also the biggest. Moreover says Wildavsky since defense tends
to be veto proof, there is a temptation to attach unrelated items
to it. (The 1994 budget carried a sum for breast cancer research, as
well as dollars for various museums and memorials) . Defense is also
one of the appropriation bills which must be passed each year,
either as a separate bill or as part of an omnibus appropriation
bill; thus since it will be passed, the temptation to add unrelated
items to it is strengthened.
OMB has had a different relationship with defense than it has
had with the other agencies. It does not have the same adversarial
role vis-a-vis defense as it does agriculture or education, rather
it is part of the OMB/OSD team. Many of the decisions that would be
taken solely at the OMB level in respect to other agencies by OMB
are taken in concert with the Department of Defense at the Office
of Secretary of Defense level . There is a partnership here
different from that which exits between OMB and other cabinet level
agencies. To some extent this results from the fact that defense is
different in its size and its emphasis on training people and
buying equipment which will defend the country against various
threat scenario's a decade into the future. Defense is also
immediately critical in ways that other functions are not.
Wildavsky suggests that the defense budget process begins with no
ceiling in its PPB process, but that a ceiling is quickly
introduced. Historically, this ceiling has been a percent of GDP,
a percent of the federal budget, a real growth percent, or most
recently a specified decline over a five year time period. OMB
plays in defense as it helps set these overall defense spending
goals in the defense planning process, prior to the start of the
defense budgeting process. Insiders also relate that OMB is not
above its usual tricks in budget review; Wildavsky notes that OMB
usually makes a Christmas gift to DOD of many items that must be
reviewed within a short time span in the late December period, as
if those who are sworn to defend the country twenty-four hours a
day would not reply to budget marks
.
Wildavsky suggests that there are patterns in defense over the
long term. Human resource spending has soared since the 1950' s in
a generally straight line increase, but defense has had a feast or
famine profile. More recently defense has come to be portrayed as
taking from the poor (human resource spending) to give to the
wasteful (defense spending) . One theme in the current writings of
Wildavsky is the theme of political conflict so increased that it
becomes political dissensus. This is particularly burdensome for
defense where there are few milestones to indicate what is
sufficient spending for the defense function. Defense operated on
bi-partisan consensus from the end of WWII to the late 1960's.
During this period there was also great consensus on other areas of
budget policy. However, constrained resources, the increasing
national debt, the end of the cold war, the aging population and
increasing health care costs have driven great fissures into areas
of consensus, so that policy that was consensual has now become the
politics of dissensus. Nowhere is this more true than in defense.
The result of this dissensus is that budgets have tended to be
bitterly contested and generally late. Numerous projects are forced
on DOD to maintain local employment and DOD, for its part, responds
by placing programs in as many districts as possible to strengthen
its political base. Wildavsky is well aware that DOD has an
extended Planning-Programming-Budgeting system-which he says is a
procedure in place that is not really followed-but he also notes
that Congressional delay on defense appropriations also makes it
difficult for DOD to link the three budgets it is currently working
with-the current year, the year that will be sent to Congress
shortly and the budget for the following year whose totals are
based on those two previous years
.
Finally, Wildavsky suggests that since the 1960 's defense has
gone from an insiders game to an outsiders game. The original
Politics described how it was possible for just a few Congressmen
on appropriation sub-committees to dominate decision making. This
was true for defense and non-defense matters. The change from that
time period has been a loss of power by the powerful committee
chairmen who rose to power based on seniority and safe electoral
districts and could reward and punish almost with impunity. To some
extent the great stability in budget decision making pictured in
the old Politics was purchased with the coin of secretive, elitist
decision making.
The seniority system for picking committee chairs and members
still is important, but seats are also gained through caucus
elections. Powerful committee chairman can be upset and disciplined
through this election process; Les Aspin gained the House Armed
Services Committee through this process and was disciplined through
it. Thus power has been modified and can be moderated. Moreover,
when the Democrat or Republican caucus picks a committee member by
vote, the vote of the rankest freshman is equal to that of the most
senior member and the power of outsiders equals that of insiders.
Since there are many more outsiders than insiders, when mobilized
in a vote on the floor or in caucus, they exceed the power of the
insiders
.
Consequently, outsiders are appointed to powerful conference
committees; outsiders pick powerful committee chairman and
sometimes ignoring the seniority system. Turf wars exist between
committees, like authorizations and appropriations, which must be
settled on the floor where outsiders have a bigger voice. There is
a proliferation of committees involved in defense; Wildavsky counts
ten involved in defense in the Senate and eleven in the House.
These committees mean there are more places where decisions about
defense are made, more opportunities for outsiders to hold seats,
and more necessity to co-ordinate the final decision on the floor
where each member has one vote. These committees demand lots of
testimony from DOD, for budget making and for oversight. Wildavsky
says that from 1982-1986, 1420 hours were spend testifying before
84 committees and subcommittees by 1306 DOD witnesses. The result
was that the DOD appropriation bill was passed on time in 3 of the
previous 15 years; on average, it was 80 days late. Thus defense
has gone from an insiders game to an outsiders game, where there is
much micromanagement and great opportunity for dissensus in defense
8
policy making. In respect to political dissensus, however, defense
budgeting is not now greatly different from non-defense budgeting.
Wildavsky' s Budgetary Odyssey
Wildavsky is best known in public administration as the author
of The Politics of the Budgetary Process, his enduring treatise on
budgetary procedure, culture, strategy, competition and power. As
we explain subsequently, rereading this book reveals how cleverly
Wildavsky interpreted congressional and executive behavior, how
clearly he wrote about strategy and power politics, and how writing
this book was a logical follow-on to the works that put Aaron "on
the map" so to speak as a very promising young political scientist
-- his book Dixon-Yates: A Study of Power Politics (1962), and
article "TVA and Power Politics," that appeared in the American
Political Science Review in 1961. Readers in political science and
public administration were initially exposed to Wildavsky'
s
analysis of budgeting in, "Political Implications of Budgetary
Reform," also published in 1961. 4
About The Politics of the Budgetary Process Dwight Waldo
once remarked, "Everyone [in political science and American
government] knew about this stuff, but he sat down and wrote it
all out. It was amazing how much of it he captured, and none of
us thought the book would receive the kind of notice it did or
that it would last as long as it has. 5 Aaron conceded as much in
his dedication in The New Politics of the Budgetary Process : "...
The Politics of the Budgetary Process . . .did a lot more for me
than I did for it." 5
Despite his assertive public demeanor and public speaking
style, Aaron was personally rather humble. This, we guess, may be
explained in part as a result of his early experiences in life,
born and raised in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn, the son
of a politically active, Yiddish and English speaking, Ukrainian
immigrant father and Latvian-Ukrainian mother. He went to
Brooklyn College because, "I was never told that [it] was a
vulgar, proletarian backwater ... So I encountered a succession of
brilliant teachers." 6 His humility also may have resulted from
the fact that as he grew older he understood more fully how much
must be learned about political culture and public policy before
one can become an expert critic, and how much time it takes to
accumulate what noted sociologist Martin Trow, a former colleague
of Aaron's in the School of Public Policy at Berkeley, has
termed "deep knowledge." Let us now turn to an analysis of the
themes and messages woven through his writings to see what deep
knowledge is rendered in some of his seminal works. We begin with
his first article on budgeting and then proceed roughly in
chronological order, with emphasis on what readers in the field
of public budgeting consider his two most important books, The
Politics of the Budgetary Process, and The New Politics of the
Budgetary Process .
As an ambitious young Oberlin professor Aaron established
the agenda for his future research on budgeting in "Political
Implications of Budgetary Reform." In retrospect, this article
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reveals the outlines of many of the major themes that were to
emerge in The Politics of the Budgetary Process and in his
subsequent writings. Students in Aaron's budgetary politics
course in the Department of Political Science at Berkeley in the
late 1960s (and presumably later) learned, by virtue of having to
plow through a required reading list that was sufficiently long
to consume almost all of one's waking hours, 8 that the study of
budgeting and budget reform had to begin with analysis of several
essential articles and books in the field, 9 followed by his
critique of these works in "Political Implications of Budgetary
Reform." In this piece Wildavsky essentially rejected the value
of attempts to develop a normative theory of budgeting, calling
instead for good descriptive analysis and the theory that would
emerge from sociopolitical behavioralism, i.e., participant
observation and direct interviews of key players and decision
makers in the budget process.
Wildavsky began his critique with an analysis of the
implications of Key's statement of the question to be addressed
by normative theory, "On what basis shall it be decided to
allocate X dollars to Activity A instead of Activity B" 10
Prospects for developing such theory were dim Wildavsky
exclaimed, "No progress has been made for the excellent reason
that the task, as posed, is impossible to fulfill." 11 In
consideration of Smithies' analytical approach and
recommendations, Wildavsky found even more to criticize. Smithies
had proposed creation of a Joint (congressional) Budget Policy
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Committee empowered to consider all revenue and spending
proposals in a single package, the expressed goal of which was to
make congressional budgeting more rational and efficient.
Wildavsky evaluated this approach and rejected it principally due
to its ignorance of power politics, and also because of
information problems that in his view could not be overcome.
Senior members of this all powerful committee would, presumably,
all be from safe districts or states and could, therefore, behave
as "elitists" --a very bad thing to Wildavsky and far too
similar to the British parliamentary method of budgeting. They
could reject the views of others in Congress and, "...could
virtually ignore the President ... and run the Executive branch so
that it is accountable only to them." 12 About the information
problem Wildavsky observed that without disparaging the need for
efficiency (which he defined as, "...maximizing budgetary
benefits given a specified distribution of shares..."), the
inevitable lack of full information and the disinclination of
participants to utilize their political resources to the fullest
extent ... leave broad areas of inertia and inattention. .. to
[public demand for] change." 13 Striking a blow for the status
quo Wildavsky argued that "slack" as opposed to efficiency in
budgeting provided room for "ingenuity and innovation" to permit
more efficiency resulting from a more decentralized and
fragmented decision process. In a "one-liner" of the type for
which he would later become famous he noted, "Most practical
budgeting may take place in a twilight zone between politics and
12
efficiency." 14
To Wildavsky the approaches of Key, Smithies and others
revealed, "...serious weakness in prevailing conceptions of the
budget." In criticism of the literature on budgeting Wildavsky
warned that reform should never be considered merely as a matter
of procedural adjustment. "There is little or no realization
among the reformers. .
.
[and here he meant both analysts and
advocates of change in academe and in Congress] that any
effective change in budgeting relationships necessarily alter the
outcomes of the budgetary process. Otherwise, why bother? Far
from being a neutral matter of 'better budgeting, ' proposed
reforms inevitably contain important implications for the
political system, that is for the 'who gets what' of government
decisions . " 1S
The search for a comprehensive normative theory was in
vain because such a theory would prescribe, "...what the
government ought to do." 16 However, it is not possible a priori
and for all time to determine what problems government policy
ought to try to solve and how programs should operate. Government
policy and, consequently, the budget must change to respond to
contingencies. Unless this is so the nation is frozen and doomed
to fail in meeting constituent and foreign policy demands.
Wildavsky was very succinct with respect to normative theory: "By
suppressing dissent, totalitarian regimes enforce their normative
theory of budgeting on others... We reject this [as a response] to
the problem of conflict in society and insist on democratic
13
procedures," 17 i.e., open participation in the budgetary decision
process. These statements, and the quote above, are very
significant in terms of tracing the origins of Aaron's emerging
career as the world's most respected and revered expert on
budgeting. Here he essentially staked out his territory relative
to what had been written about budgeting in the past and what
would be important to study and write about in the future.
Wildavsky had discovered a huge vacuum in a neglected and
virtually unrecognized, but very important area of political
science and American government. This was literally the
opportunity of a lifetime as it turned out. It was not so much
that what had been written was wrong (and much of it was wrong he
concluded) ; the key was his discovery that political scientists
and public administrators conceived of the study of budgeting in
the wrong way. Aaron seized the opportunity.
Wildavsky began by delineating the approach to theory
development that should not be pursued any longer and explained
why, and then he defined what a proper theory of budgeting should
contain: " . . . it would not be fruitful to devise a measure. .
.
[to]
give an objective rank ordering of agency budget success in
securing appropriations. . . [because] the agency which succeeds in
getting most of what it desires. . .may be the one which is best at
figuring out what it is likely to get. A better measure, perhaps,
would be an agency's record in securing appropriations calculated
as percentages above or below previous years' appropriations." 18
Here he defined the base as the standard measure against which to
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measure marginal change -- this is the nascence of incrementalism
in his writing. Still, he concluded, even this was too simplistic
and inadequate. Because external factors including service
demand, emergencies, advances in scientific knowledge, "...beyond
the control of an agency," or "affluence" (the size of the base
relative to service demand obligations) , and other variables
internal to the agency ("...some [programs] are doing very well
and others quite poorly") that are difficult to measure and
explain, " it would be necessary to validate the measure (the
size of the increment) by an intensive study of each agency's
appropriation history..." Here is his emergent emphasis on the
need to investigate agencies on an individual basis with the
implication that a behavioral and participant observational
approach was necessary to understand the variables that explain
budgetary success and failure. He summarized it as follows,
"...the obvious truth [is] that the budget is inextricably linked
to the political system." 19
The theory Wildavsky sought would have to be successful in,
"...accounting for the operation and outcomes [emphasis added]
of the budgetary process. A theory of influence would describe
the power relationships among the participants, explain why some
are more successful than others in achieving their budgetary
goals, state the conditions under which various strategies are or
are not efficacious, and in this way account for the pattern of
budgetary decisions." 20 Here we note the emphasis on power,
influence, strategy and contingent response capacity --
15
benchmark standards, and criteria as well, that he established
and applied in his later work. In the same section of this
article he developed the notion of agency "fair share" and
inquiry into how this standard might be defined.
At the conclusion of "Political Implications of Budgetary
Reform," Wildavsky explained the value of investigating the niche
he had discovered: "Perhaps the 'study of budgeting' is just
another expression for the 'study of politics ... the vantage point
offered by concentration on budget decisions offers a useful and
much neglected perspective from which to analyze the making of
policy. The opportunities for comparison are ample, the outcomes
are specific and quantifiable, and a dynamic quality is assured
by virtue of the comparative ease with which one can study the
development of budgetary items over a period of years." 21
Wildavsky' s definition of what would constitute good theory
identifies the very essence of what he sought to achieve in
conducting the research and the writing of The Politics of the
Budgetary Process . He envisioned the development of a
comprehensive, empirically validated, descriptive theory. "The
point is that... until we know something about the 'existential
situation' in which the participants find themselves, proposals for
major reform must be based on woefully inadequate understanding." 22
Here we find the articulation of his intent to evaluate "major
reforms" that produced such a great volume of research and writing
over the next thirty years as he examined various federal
government budget and public policy initiatives. Wildavsky'
s
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prescriptions for budgetary reform grew from his collaborative
research with Arthur Hammond on the Department of Agriculture in
the early 1960s, and continued through a series of articles in late
1960s, most of which are included in Budgeting: A Comparative
Theory of Budgetary Processes published in 1975 at the mid-point of
his career as a budget critic. As we note in analysis of some of
this work, between 1961 and 1975 Wildavsky and his coauthors
explained and critiqued virtually every budgetary or policy reform
experiment to improve policy through the injection of "efficiency
" and "rationality " into federal decision making. Among these
reforms were zero-base budgeting, cost-benefit analysis, systems
analysis and other management initiatives embraced by the Executive
branch under a succession of Presidents -- and rejected or ignored
in part or entirely by Congress. Attempts at reform in the nation's
capitol generated tremendous opportunity for the knowledgeable
budgetary and public policy critic.
After he had established his name and credibility with
publication of The Politics of the Budgetary Process , the door was
wide open for further analysis of emerging initiatives. Wildavsky
succeeded in convincing most, if not all, students of politics that
they should be interested in his views on budgeting and budget
reform, and also on the analysis of public policy and policy
alternatives more generally. 23 This confidence enabled Wildavsky
to accomplish much in the decade of the 1960s and the first half
of the 1970s. Aaron was positive that he was right in his criticism
of federal government budget reforms and analytical methodologies,
17
particularly when they were aborted by their sponsors or political
successors
.
In his first article on budgeting, and then in The Politics
of the Budgetary Process published three years later, Wildavsky
proceeded to conduct the research and write to fill the enormous
void he had discovered. With publication of The Politics , he
accomplished the academic equivalent of hitting the winning home
run in the seventh game of the world series. In the rest of his
career he was to achieve, metaphorically, the feat of hitting more
home runs than anyone ever thought possible as evidenced in the
Social Science Index that records how much his work has been cited
and, more importantly, in the hearts and minds of his colleagues
and admirers. None of what he would write after 1964 would mean as
much in terms of establishing Aaron Wildavsky' s academic stardom as
his first book on budgeting. Let us turn to a review of the two
works on budgeting for which Wildavsky is best known.
The Argument for Incrementalism
:
The Politics of the Budgetary Process
The Politics of the Budgetary Process 24 was published in 1964,
and revised in 1974, 1979, and 1984. The New Politics of the
Budgetary Process was published in 1988 and revised in 1992. The
genius of the original politics was that it spoke to a broad
spectrum of interests from the aggressive bureaucrat who wanted to
know what was important in getting a budget accepted, to the
organizational scholar interested in the possibility of rational
comprehensive decision-making. For the academic, the original
Politics appeared contemporaneously with theoretical explorations
of complex organization decision making which both supported and
critiqued rational and incremental decision making. These ranged
from Herbert Simon's Models of Man to Cyert and March's A
Behavioral Theory of the Firm25 and Anthony Downs' An Economic
Theory of Decision Making in a Democracy to the Charles Lindblom'
s
article on "The Science of Muddling Through" 26 in which Lindblom
states that although comprehensive decision making can be
described, "it cannot by practiced because it puts too great a
strain by far on man's limited ability to calculate." 27
Wildavsky concluded his review of this debate by noting that
".
. .we must deal with real men in the real world for whom the best
they can get is to be preferred to the perfection they cannot
achieve. Unwilling or unable to alter the basic features of the
political system, they seek to make it work for them in
budgeting..." 28 Wildavsky suggested that the" existing budgetary
process works much better than is commonly supposed. " However he
also noted there is no "special magic in the status quo. Inertia
and ignorance as well as experience and wisdom may be responsible
for the present state of affairs." 29 Wildavsky then observed that
the major improvements suggested by rational -comprehensive critics
would turn out to be undesirable or unfeasible, or both. Instead,
reforms ought to concentrate on a more thorough-going incremental
approach, rather than a more comprehensive one. 30 It is this tension
between the rational and incremental, between budgetary actors as
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they were and as they might be that gave The Politics of the
Budgetary Process the theoretical strength to be more than a
catalog of what budget makers said to one another in various
meetings in the Executive branch and Congress during the late
1950's and early 1960's.
Conversely, irrespective of its theoretical content, what
budgetmakers said to one another had real power for practitioners.
Wildavsky captures the essence of the budgetary struggle in two
short paragraphs: "Long service in Washington has convinced high
agency officials that some things count a great deal and others
only a little ... budget officials commonly derogate the importance
of the formal aspects of their work as a means of securing
appropriations ...' It ' s not what's in your estimates but how good a
politician you are that matters.'" However being a good politician
had a special meaning; it "requires three things: cultivation of an
active clientele, the development of confidence among other
governmental officials, and skill in following strategies that
exploit one's opportunities to the maximum. Doing good work was
seen as part of being a good politician. 31 " Wildavsky viewed
confidence and clientele strategies as everywhere present or
ubiquitous. Those strategies that were dependent on time, place,
and circumstance, he called contingent. This, then, is the
formulation that would shape budget discussion for the next three
decades
.
In the preface to the 1964 edition, Wildavsky acknowledged
that The Politics was not a comprehensive work on the subject of
20
budgeting. Among other things, it did not deal at all with how
funds were raised or budgeting for defense. Wildavsky concluded
that he would be pleased "if this study came to be regarded as the
point of departure" 32 for more specialized studies. In this short
book (180 pages of text), Wildavsky succeeded in liberating the
study of budgeting from the claustrophobic rhythms of formal
procedures to focus the attention of observers on the political
nature of the budget process. The second edition of Politics did
not come out until 1974, but this intervening decade saw a great
deal of work done on budgeting. If the intent of the first edition
of the Politics was to interest scholars in budgeting, that
intention was successfully realized, both by Wildavsky and by
others too numerous to mention, at the U.S. federal level and at
state and local government levels and in other national settings.
With so much research already published and so much more in
progress, the tone of the preface of the second edition of
Politics was understandably much more authoritative. The edition
also adds a new chapter on program budgeting (still arguing that
the rational comprehensive approach would not work) and a chapter
directed at restoring the norms of guardianship and reciprocity to
Congress through an annual expenditure increment, essentially a
cost of living increase which could be redistributed as Congress
saw fit, but not exceeded. Some of the logic of this approach was
included in the Congressional Budget Reform Act of 1974,
particularly in the establishment of the Current Services Budget.
Of the original Politics , Wildavsky noted that early drafts
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had "...received an unusually negative response (nine publishers
rejected it) . 33 Readers found it too critical of government (if they
were in it) or too tolerant of bad practices (if they suffered from
them) . There were stern admonitions to abjure frivolity from those
who felt that treating budgeting like a game made little of their
earnest efforts. The large number of anecdotes (a derogatory term
among some classes of social scientists) should be abandoned, they
said, in favor of more rigor. Apparently they meant I should use
more numbers, though when I later turned to mathematical
formulations, I was told with equal conviction that these arid
formulations would not help determine what would happen the
following week in any number of vital bureaus. At first the
reaction in the old BOB was that none of it was true. After about
two years the word was that some of it might be true. By the time
four years had elapsed the line was that most of it was true, but
wasn't it a shame." 34
If this seems somewhat lighthearted, Wildavsky also indicated
in this preface that in one critical area there was a change in
emphasis from the original Politics -in the relationship between
budgetary incrementalism and organizational learning: "I would no
longer assume ... that organizations, as distinct from individuals,
actually make use of the method of successive limited approximation
to move away from the worse and toward the better." 35 This is a hint
of his less optimistic view of the budgetary process found in The
New Politics of the Budgetary Process , in particular the ability of
the process to be self -correcting
.
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The old Politics was revised again in 1979 with the addition
of material on zero based budgeting and a chapter on reform in
Congress focused on the early returns from the Congressional Budget
Reform Act of 1974. The last revision of the old Politics occurred
in 1984. For the first time, the question 'Is there a pro-spending
bias in the budgetary process' appears in the chapter on Congress
(his answer was yes) and the final chapter is about spending
limits. This chapter opens by noting that the 'classic sign of
political dissensus is the inability to agree on the budget' and
continues by observing "How we Americans used to deride the 'banana
republics' of the world for their 'repetitive budgeting' under
which the budget was reallocated many times during the year, until
it became hardly recognizable, truly a thing of shreds and patches.
Yet resolutions that continue last year's funding for agencies, for
want of ability to agree on this year's, are becoming a way of life
in the United States. An annual budget is a great accomplishment.
Sending out signals on spending that remain predictable so that
others can take them into account for a full twelve moths is no
mean achievement." 36 Examining the decay of the budget process and
the inability of past reforms to deal with total spending,
Wildavsky predicted that future reforms would deal with the
quantity of spending. "Limits on total spending do not guarantee
budgetary control, but without limits on total spending there can
be no control," 37 said Wildavsky.
The 1984 edition is clearly a transitional work. The old
prefaces were discarded and a new preface and prologue written. In
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the prologue, Wildavsky asserted that the landscape of budgeting in
the US had changed dramatically. Norms of annularity, balance, and
comprehensiveness have been shattered beyond repair and the norm of
a balanced budget disappeared in the mid- 1960 's, and was replaced
with an injunction simply to spend: "Better budgets became those
which spent more." 38 With the death of the balanced budget norm,
it becomes more difficult for control agencies to turn back
spending requests ... "why take the heat for turning people down." 39
In reflecting on the Politics , Wildavsky believed that the sections
on calculation were still as relevant as ever, if not more so but,
by contrast, the sections on agency strategies for getting funds
'depends on conditions-trust among participants, ability to
anticipate behavior, collective concern for totals, comparability
of accounts-that no longer exist." 40 Without limits, there can be
no sense of shared sacrifice; nor without accurate comparisons of
budget categories can there be a sense of fair share. To get back
to the golden age of incrementalism, where changes are small,
alternatives resemble those of the past, and patterns or
relationships among participants remain stable, reforms have to
reestablish norms that encouraged such behavior, norms like
annularity, balance and comprehensiveness. This was to be the last
edition of the Politics of the Budgetary Process.
The New Politics of Budgeting:
From Consensus to Dissensus •
The first edition of The New Politics of the Budgetary Process
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appeared in 1988. This was a different and in some ways a darker,
more pessimistic, book than its predecessor. In the first chapter
budgets are described as conflicting promises. The second chapter
explores the colonial roots of the balanced budget norm and traces
its demise in the mid-1960s in the U.S. The third chapter describes
the classic period of American budgeting, from the late 1940s to
the late 1960s --that period of time so well described by the old
Politics . Chapter four traces the collapse of the consensus on what
should be done in society through government. Chapters five and six
describe the institutional and procedural manifestations of the
collapse of consensus for budgeting, or as Wildavsky called it,
budgetary dissensus. Entitlements are treated in two chapters and
defense is given a separate chapter.
The book concludes with an extensive chapter on reform. The
message of this chapter is far from simple; although some of the
typical reforms are discussed, Wildavsky seemed most concerned with
the loss of consensus in society and what this loss does to the
budget process: "Indeed, budget resolutions, automatic spending
reductions to achieve balance, item vetoes, balanced budget
amendments, and offsets are all formal substitutes for what used to
be done informally." 41 The final sentence in this book warns against
overloading budgeting: "As much as I respect the importance of
budgeting and the talents of budgeters, to substitute budgeting for
government will not work." 42 The second edition (1992) appended two
more chapters, one on causes of the deficit and one on solutions
for the deficit. This chapter discusses budget summitry, spending
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limits, and spending caps, but its major concern is with the
politics of dissensus. It concludes, "A politics of budgetary
dissensus means that any way the budget goes-upward, downward, or
sideways-there will be a lot of dissatisfaction." 43
It is simplistic to say that budgeting and the budget process
have changed between the initial issue of the Politics of the
Budgetary Process in 1964 and the second edition of the New
Politics in 1992; it is, however, all too true. It also appears
that agreement on policy direction in American society has also
changed (lessened) , and this diminution has reverberated through the
budgetary process. In the classical era of American national
budgeting --that quarter of a century between the end of World War
II and the early 1970s --there was a clearly recognizable budgetary
process. The budget submitted to Congress was the acknowledged
starting point and its totals were not far from the previous year's
Congressional action. Hence comes the emphasis on incrementalism.
The budget was expected to be balanced, except in wartime or
depression, although in fact minor deficits were run in most of
those years. Nonetheless, revenues and expenditures remained in
close approximation and incremental advance was the dominant
characteristic of the era. Appropriation bills were to be passed on
time and to last the entire year. This was a picture of stability.
Budgets were assembled in fragments and analyzed by
specialized subcommittees in relative obscurity. The subcommittee
recommendations paid special attention to increases and decreases
and tended to be followed by the full committee and the parent
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chamber. Agencies were expected to be advocates, the Budget Bureau
was expected to cut most programs while pushing for money for the
President's preferences, and Congress was the guardian of the
purse. The House Appropriations committee filled this role most
fully as a "place devoted to looking for cuts and more cuts, 44while
the Senate functioned as a court of appeals. In this stable picture
aids to calculation and strategies existed because there was
general agreement on the direction and content of policy. This
allowed committees to deal with the increments of change rather
than renegotiating or negotiating basic public policy.
What are the major changes? The Budget Committees have been
placed in a position where they decide how much the Appropriations
Committees will have to spend (divide) . Wildavsky suggested that
even the Appropriations committees tend to pad their favorite
programs 45 . Access to hearings and committee meetings is far more
open; budget hearings and debates are even broadcast on television.
Expertise is more widely spread: the creation of the Congressional
Budget Office and its development of expertise has given Congress
the power to closely check administration numbers. Agencies may
even go to CBO before they finish their budgets to get
methodological guidance or agreement on the numbers they plan to
use to drive their budgets. Committee staff numbers and roles have
expanded, but all this expertise also has had some negative
consequences in that experts are deferred to less in this process




The annual budget tends to have disappeared; appropriation
bills were habitually passed late and often as omnibus
appropriation bills instead of 13 separate bills, sometimes as much
as 2 or 3 months into the fiscal year. Instead of fragmentation,
specialization, and stability, the present budget period is marked
by disagreement, delay, and dissensus. While the Budget Reform Act
of 1974 allowed Congress to focus on the big picture, it also set
the stage for overt conflict over who would get what. According to
Wildavsky the President has tended to look upon the base as what he
proposed the previous year, not what Congress passed and he signed,
thus agreement over the base in general tended to disappear. 46
The Office of Management and Budget also had changed. It had
always been very powerful in defining the base and in testing
increments of change vis-a-vis the agencies. Now it had taken an
even more powerful role as the lead in negotiating the President's
position with Congress, a job once left solely to or only shared
with the relevant agency heads. However, as OMB became more active
in Congress, it became less predictable to the agencies. In the
early 1980s, David Stockman changed the OMB focus and provided
staff and an information system to track the President's budget
wherever it went in Congress, and, to score it against the
President's policy preferences. This gave OMB the information it
needed to appear at committee hearings to attempt to reverse
positions that a subcommittee had taken which did not follow the
President's budgetary policy. Moreover, since the Reagan Presidency
in its first term was ideologically committed to certain spending
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directions, OMB was able to impose a top-down budget system on the
agencies where all the big decisions were made for the agencies,
since their share of the pie was set by equations written by OMB.
Wildavsky suggested that this process virtually excluded cabinet
departments and agencies from the formulation of the budget 47 .
Moreover since OMB had its eye on the big picture and would
horsetrade to get the most for the least, OMB had surrendered its
role as protector of the agencies against sudden and unreasonable
congressional reductions in their proposed budgets, 48 which meant
that agency budgets could be in jeopardy right up to the day the
President signed the appropriation bill.
If the politics of the budgetary process had changed, so had
Wildavsky' s vision of it. In the preface to the second edition of
the New Politics , Wildavsky stated " The New politics of the
Budgetary Process was animated by a quite different vision of
budgeting as an incremental process... My major purpose in
introducing this term (budgeting is incremental) was to make
readers aware that comprehensive consideration of the budget as a
whole. . .went beyond the possibilities of human calculation. Were it
tried, comprehensive calculation would also make agreement on the
budget much more difficult. And so, at a time of budgetary
dissensus, it has done... It does matter greatly when many more
major matters are disagreed. Why else would the budget process be
so stultified, taking up so much more time and room, often to so
little ef feet ... Consensus means that there is agreement on the
budgetary base; when that consensus dissipates, so does
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incrementalism. . . . dissensual budgeting leads to larger and more
rapid changes, which increase disagreement." 49
More broadly put, Wildavsky warned that there remained a deep
dissensus about the kind of government and society America ought to
have: "And these ideological dif ferences . . . are still being played
out through the budget. Only now these conflicts are sharper.
Therefore, those who wish to understand politics must acquaint
themselves with budgeting if they want to know what is going on." 50
Budgeting as the locus of crucial information is a major theme of
the original Politics of 1964 as he wrote both in the 1964 book and
again quoting himself in 1992: "If one looks at politics as a
process by which the government mobilizes resources to meet
pressing problems, then the budget is a focus of these efforts." 51
This would indicate that Wildavsky believed that the budget was and
would continue to be an even more important focal point in
determining policy now than heretofore.
Arguments Against the Rational Comprehensive Model
To resume our approximate chronological order of review, after
publication of The Politics of the Budgetary Process in 1964 there
followed a succession of articles on or related to budgeting. Due
to the importance of several pieces and length limitations we have
chosen to critique two articles from this period post-1964 through
roughly 1969: "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost Benefit
Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting," (1966) and
"Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS," (1969). Several other
important articles published in the 1960s and up to 1974 are
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covered in our review of Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of
Budgetary Processes that contains updated and edited versions of
much of what Wildavsky published after The Politics of the
Budgetary Process through 1975, including some excerpted chapters
from coauthored books
.
Reforms such as program budgeting, cost-benefit analysis and
systems analysis were much debated topics in the 1960s and early
1970s among analytical types struggling either to implement change
or resist it in the Executive branch in the nation's capital. Even
some members of Congress and their staffers sought advice on what
to make of much ballyhooed reforms. Was program budgeting and the
prevailing intent to specify objectives, quantifying them, and then
projecting them out in terms of five year resource requirements
doable? Should it be done? Was it worth the effort? Was Charlie
Hitch's systems analysis methodology magic or sophistry? And what
about cost-benefit analysis -- was it panacea or poison? Wildavsky,
Allen Schick and numerous others attempted to address these and
similar questions and concerns -- and they came up with different
answers. Aaron was always the skeptic, e.g., in articles including
"Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS," and "The Political Economy of
Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program
Budgeting," reviewed below. Wildavsky' s criticism accomplished
virtual miracles in clarifying what government was attempting to
accomplish --he made the objectives of reforms clear, especially
when they were not achieved, he explained why they failed and,
typically, why they should have failed, i.e., he turned hamburger
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into steak. In doing so he eventually began to influence policy and
reform.
As Wildavsky' s advice was sought more widely, his articles and
books were read not just by students and academics, but by the
participants in the budgetary process themselves. It also did not
hurt that his students began to go to work in government and to
rise up in the agencies in which they worked to positions of
greater influence, or at least to positions as policy and budget
analysts who sought to "speak truth to power" no matter how
frustrating this experience turned out to be as good analysis and
advice was ignored or, in some cases, actively opposed and
suppressed. Wildavsky knew what he was after and he had started
his journey and, unbeknownst to him at the time, established the
basis of inquiry for a vast amount of research on budgeting to be
conducted over the following three decades.
"The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost Benefit Analysis,
Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting," contains Wildavsky'
s
critical and sometimes scathing analysis of the use and usefulness
of "rational and systematic" methods to assist decision making. It
is important as a response to what critics said was missing from
The Politics of the Budgetary Process . Furthermore, other writers
on budgeting were making claims about the significance of the
analytical reforms of the 1960s. For example, Allen Schick claimed
in "The Road to PPB : The Stages of Budget Reform," that the
contribution of PPB was such that after it, "...the ethos of
budgeting will shift from justification to analysis. To far greater
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extent. . .budget decisions will be influenced by explicit statements
of objectives and by a formal weighing of the costs and benefits." 52
Wildavsky's response was to demonstrate some of the limitations of
the "rational instruments" of economics, systems analysis and PPB,
and then to conclude as follows: "Studies based on efficiency
criteria are much needed and increasingly useful . My quarrel is not
with them... I have been concerned that a single value ... could
triumph over other values without explicit consideration [of]
others. I would feel much better if political rationally were
. . .pursued with the same vigor and capability as is economic
efficiency. In that case I would have fewer qualms about extending
efficiency studies into the decision-making apparatus. My purpose
[is] to emphasize that economic rationality, however
laudable ... ought not to swallow up political rationality - but it
will do so if political rationality continues to lack trained and
adept defenders." 53
In "Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS," which says more
about policy analysis than budgeting, Wildavsky extended his
criticism of program budgeting. He explained, "We all accept the
need for better policy analysis... [to provide] information that
contributes to making an agency politically and socially
relevant. .
.
[it] sifts alternative means and ends in the elusive
pursuit of policy recommendations ... it seeks knowledge and
opportunities for coping with an uncertain future .. .policy
analysis is a variant of planning... a tool of social change...
[and it] is expensive in ...time, talent, and money." 54 The
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problem with program budgeting to Wildavsky was simply that, "No
one can do PPBS . . .no one knows how to do it. .
.
[it] cannot be
stated in operational terms. The inability to perform PPB,
combined with the fact that in Wildavsky' s view it did not
accommodate contingency easily, meant that program budgeting
could not accommodate the politics of budgeting. "The reason for
the difficulty is that telling an agency to adopt program
budgeting means telling it to find better policies and there is
no formula for doing that. . .one can (and should) talk about
measuring effectiveness, estimating costs, and comparing
alternatives, but that is a far cry f rom. .. formulating better
policy. 55 Policy, and policy analysis ,"... cannot be specified in
advance for all agencies .. .policy analysis takes time -- can
seldom respond to the day to day emergencies typical of
budgeting. Rather, it builds the long-term knowledge base of an
agency." 56 And, this could lead to increased political
rationality and better budgeting. In conclusion he noted: "In
many ways the times are propitious for policy analysis .. .Whether
or not there is sufficient creativity in us to devise better
policies remains to be seen. If we are serious about improving
public policy, we will go beyond the fashionable pretense of PPBS
to show others what the best policy analysis can achieve." 57
This article reveals how, to Wildavsky, the search for better
budgeting really was a search for better policy. It demonstrated
how he merged his work on budgetary politics, power and incentives
into the emergent literature on public policy analysis, for which
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he was to become a leading spokesman as Dean of The Graduate School
of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. The
work that encompasses the full panoply of Aaron's views on public
policy analysis is Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of
Policy Analysis which we do not review in this essay but recommend
to readers interested in how Wildavsky conceived of the field, the
task of conducting analysis, and even the administration of a
public policy school.
Wildavsky wrote and coauthored nine more books on budgeting in
twenty eight years after publication of The Politics of the
Budgetary Process . The first of these was The Budgeting and
Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, Or Money Doesn't Grow On
Trees, researched and written with Jeanne Nienaber and published in
1973, approximately nine years after The Politics . This book
continued Wildavsky' s assault on program budgeting, although its
most important contribution in our view lies in its investigation
of budgetary justification, behavior and strategy in the Department
of Agriculture and particularly in the U.S. Forest Service and in
various agencies of the Department of Interior with responsibility
for outdoor recreation. This book reveals, in part, how
congressional committees reacted to different types of
justification and strategy, or lack thereof, used by agency
advocates of funding for outdoor recreation programs.
The literature on public budgeting in the late 1960s was
notably remiss in its absence of focus on international
experience. Naomi Caiden and Wildavsky worked for a period of
35
about five years to fill this void, and in 1974 they published
the book that is considered the classic work in this area,
Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries . To quote Richard Rose
about this work, " Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries is a
magnificent analysis of how administrators behave in situations
of chronic fiscal crisis. As a realist Wildavsky [and Caiden] did
not dismiss the problems of 100 member states of the United
Nations as 'impossible.' Instead, he [they] outlined the
stratagems used when finance is uncertain." 58
Caiden and Wildavsky found that strategic behavior in the
budget process was not singularly an American federal government
phenomenon. Strategic behavior occurred in a variety of budget
processes in rich and poor countries alike, as well as at
sub-national levels in the U.S. Caiden and Wildavsky further
suggested that the kinds of strategies and their frequency as
well as their departure from desired budgetary practices varies
with the wealth and predictability of the jurisdiction. Where
fiscal conditions are poor and the fiscal future is certain,
strategies are least used and most moderate: everyone knows how
much will be available and it is not worth extreme strategic
effort. Revenue budgeting prevails. Caiden and Wildavsky
concluded that strategies are used most is where uncertainty is
greatest, namely in poorer countries where the fiscal environment
is uncertain and changing. Fiscal guardians must constantly shift
position -- hold back money --to keep the country liquid, and
the spending agencies are constantly rejustifying their budgets
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because they fear that the Treasury will take back the money. The
rich and certain countries do less strategizing in this
framework, because wealth and certainty lead to norms of expected
behavior and desirable conduct. Those who break these norms,
e.g., by padding, can be easily identified and punished. Caiden
and Wildavsky discussed other variations in the pattern of wealth
and certainty, observing that in like circumstances people will
behave in similar ways. Thus, the fundamental sameness around the
world of budgetary strategies flows from the functional
equivalents of budgetary processes, because everywhere there are
those who want more than they can get, and others whose business
is to show them that they cannot have it. "Balancing these
competing claims is not easy. Profound differences in role and
task reinforce the struggle for power between Finance and
Planning." 59
A theme of this book is that the numbers planned and printed
in the budgets of poor countries do not mean much, in part because
they are based upon revenue expectations that are highly uncertain.
Caiden and Wildavsky demonstrated that in these nations budgets
were weak predictors of actual spending both in terms of total
expenditures and programmatic distribution of spending. This thesis
has been tested in untold numbers of doctoral dissertations and
academic papers in application to specific nations or groups of
countries. Generally, these tests support the Caiden-Wildavsky
hypothesis, and when they don't, the authors, of course, have to
explain why this is the case relative to the Caiden-Wildavsky
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thesis. This is the mark of a significant book that contributes new
knowledge to the field -- it sets the standard against which work
after it must be tested.
Wildavsky also collaborated with Hugh Heclo in the early
1970s to produce another classic work: The Private Government of
Public Money . Again, to quote Richard Rose, "The Private
Government of Public Money was a great book about public
expenditure in Britain because it was not about money. It was
about 'village life inside Whitehall .' _With his coauthor, Hugh
Heclo, Wildavsky interviewed scores of 'villagers' and saw that
they were not so much concerned with money as with maintaining
political consensus among barons in charge of different Cabinet
departments. Consensus was achieved by excluding the public from
decisions about billions of pounds." 60
In fact, Heclo did most of the interviews for this book
because Wildavsky' s interviewing style, striking right to the heart
of issues rather than pursuing them circuitously and patiently,
tended to put Whitehall bureaucrats on edge to put it mildly
according to Heclo. The Private Government of Public Money is a
significant book because it divulges the problems of budgeting
under parliamentary government where most taxing and spending
decisions are made in private by a key committee of Cabinet, where
power is held closely, information is not shared with other
ministers and departments except very carefully and selectively,
and where decisions are made by the Prime Minister and his (or her)
close staff and ministers and high ranking Treasury officials
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without much or any party consultation at the final stages of
decision. Under this system the public, and most members of
Parliament as well, are virtually locked out of the process. Once
the PM's budget is tabled in the House of Commons, the tax and
spending policy and the numbers in the budget are essentially a
"done deal." Parliament may (and does) debate the budget before it
votes its appropriations, but the changes to the Prime Minister's
"proposal" typically are of minor significance. On the other hand,
if the budget fails to pass, the government may fall because the
House of Commons is controlled by the party of the PM.
The significance of this book in great part rests in its
demonstration of the substantial differences between budgeting in
a parliamentary system where the legislative and executive branches
of government coincide as opposed to budgeting under the
Constitutional separation of powers system employed in the U.S. The
politics of budgeting is substantially more public under the U.S.
constitutional system than it is in parliamentary systems. Despite
complaints about elitism and decisions favoring "special interests"
made behind "closed doors in smoke-filled rooms" so often made
about budgeting by the U.S. Congress, Heclo and Wildavsky
demonstrated that in terms of public participation, openness of the
decision process and, ultimately, service to the public good,
things could be worse
.
Wildavsky' s book Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary
Processes (1975) is a of compendium on budgeting produced from a
synthesis and compilation of articles and book chapters written by
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Wildavsky and his collaborators in the decade after publication of
The Politics of the Budgetary Process . However, the book is more
than a mere compilation of previous work. Among other things,
Budgeting presented new descriptive theory (see chapter 12 written
with Aidan Vining) , additional comparative material written with
Naomi Caiden on international budgeting, chapters on France and
Japan, fascinating material on the Oakland project (rewritten with
Alex Radian) from his article "Leave City Budgeting Alone"
coauthored with close friend and School of Public Policy colleague
Arnold Meltsner, excerpts from Implementation coauthored with the
young and brilliant Jeffrey Pressman. The book also includes
empirical analyses of federal budgeting based upon previous work
with Otto Davis and Michael Dempster, and a chapter on budgetary
history that eventually evolved into a book coauthored with Carolyn
Webber, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World
published in 1986.
In the concluding chapters of Budgeting, Wildavsky updated
the argument made in his 1966 article on "radical
incrementalism.
"
61 He reiterated that congressional budgeting is
and should be done by many committees rather than one, that
greater specialization versus less would improve policy and its
translation into budgets, that congressional committees should
evolve and change to fulfill new roles to avoid adding new
committees, that participation in the budgetary process should be
open rather than restricted to the few and powerful, that
bureaucrats should not be allowed to block public participation
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in lobbying their causes before Congress, and that the budget
process should be simplified. He rejected suggestions that the
President should be allowed to make proportionate reductions from
congressionally established ceilings on spending because this
power would result in unwanted congressional appropriation
padding and also cause Congress to violate its ceilings. He also
rejected the notion of binding five year expenditure projections
as too confining and incapable of accommodating uncertainty. He
noted that more data on programs and policy outcomes would not
necessarily improve budgeting -- in fact too much information
hinders decision making. And he rejected again calls for a
congressional Joint Committee on the Budget for the same reasons
he had rejected this idea earlier -- too much danger of elitism
and inability to cope with so much specialized information
._
The major procedural reform he proposed was the annual
expenditure increment. "Congress first decides whether it wants
to reallocate funds for existing programs in around a dozen major
areas of policy. Then it relates the last $10 billion or so to
its desire for new expenditures, together with its preferences on
taxation." 62 This would be done after Congress decided how much
the annual expenditure increment above last year's base would be;
he proposed 3% as an approximate target and suggested that rules
should be set to compel Congress not to exceed the limit once it
was set.
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Wildavsky on the Quest for Budget Balance and Control
In Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes,
Wildavsky offered a refined prescription on changes that ought to
be made in federal budgeting. This is perhaps his best statement,
as of 1975, on how "radical incremental reform" could improve the
quality of policy and budgetary analysis and, ultimately, the
responsiveness of resource allocation decision making to the needs
and preferences of the American public. Subsequently, in How to
Limit Government Spending and nine other articles and book chapters
that delve into spending limitation and deficit control
alternatives, tax expenditure politics, "epistemology" and the
cultural implications of deficits and deficit control, Wildavsky
explained in great detail how federal budgeting should be further
altered. These works reveal the evolution of Wildavsky' s thinking
on reform up to 1980 from the arguments advanced earlier in "Toward
a Radical Incrementalism. . ." and Budgeting . His later book written
with Joseph White, The Deficit and the Public Interest , provided a
comprehensive critique of the politics of the deficit, deficit
reduction initiatives, and the extent to which they succeeded and
failed during the 1980s.
In How to Limit Government Spending Wildavsky extended his
arguments for budgetary restraint, but at this point the focus of
his analysis was on proposals for a Constitutional amendment to tie
spending growth to the rate of increase in GNP . What Wildavsky said
everyone wanted was less inflation, lower taxes, better budgeting
and smaller spending. He foresaw the necessity for a spending limit
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and indicated that it should be viewed as a social contract rather
than just accepted begrudgingly by government. Federal spending
should be limited in response to the will of the people and the
needs of the economy. He allowed that we may argue about the
appropriate index to which spending increases should be tied --
alternatives to GNP indexing, but not about the fact that limits
should be set. The barrier to accepting such a limit was the
result of the "Pogo Principle" [borrowed from noted cartoonist and
social critic Walt Kelly] , "We have seen the enemy and they are
us." 63 We all want more and cuts to pay for our gains should come
from someone else. Wildavsky concluded that a Constitutional
amendment was necessary. After explaining the criteria to be met
by proposals, the rationale for this type of limit, how to deal
with the "end runs" to get around the limit that could be
anticipated, how to deal with contingency, the need for spending
flexibility, enforcement procedures and judicial interpretation,
the positions of "winners and losers" and how their anticipation of
net effect would condition their position toward the reform, he
observed, "The connection between size [of government spending] and
[economic] progress is made by the use of a vocabulary of
determinism. .. expenditure, so we are told, is 'uncontrollable.' To
say that is... to say that our government is uncontrollable ... that
we-the-people are out of control as well. The purpose of
Constitutional expenditure limits is precisely is to restore the
reality of self-control to our government and thereby, as citizens,
to our political lives." 64
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In The Deficit and the Public Interest (1989) , White and
Wildavsky eloquently update and augment the argument for spending
control. It is not possible, due to length limits, to do credit to
this book in review here -- it is virtually an encyclopedia on
budgetary and fiscal policy experience in the 1980s. The book
provides extensive critiques of reform, of control measures
attempted (e.g., Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, etc.), the politics of
entitlement control and tax reform, among other topics. It is a
"must read" for students of contemporary budgeting and fiscal
policy. White and Wildavsky concluded that the deficit was a
product of different value systems, and the conflict and
competition over these values in the budgetary process (with the
Pogo Principle" still much in evidence) . They showed that the
deficit served a variety of interests, not all of them bad or
leading to undesirable consequences. They suggested a "moderate
proposal on the deficit; "... accept some level of deficit, at
least for awhile, move to reduce its size marginally, deficit
reduction in one 'no fooling' package with genuine commitment to
implement the cut. They cautioned in conclusion, "The deficit has
become an all purpose weapon, used to oppose or support virtually
any position. This is bad policy and worse analysis; it has
paralyzed our political system. Fixated on the deficit, we ignore
other questions." 65 These questions must be addressed if the
public interest is to be served.
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The Political Implications of Budgetary Reform Revisited
Wildavsky reconsidered his 1962 article on the " Political
Implications of Budgetary Reform.
"
in 1992. 66 While he basically
supported most of what he had said about the budgetary process
three decades earlier, there are a few highly significant
differences. Three decades had taught Wildavsky that not all change
was incremental and that large policy changes can be made; he cites
Medicare and the Clean Air Act as examples. He again concluded the
search for a single normative theory was not useful, because there
can be several normative theories represented in the budgetary
process at any point in time. Third, when the environment of
budgetary politics changes, so does budgeting. Thus, in an era of
constrained resources, budgetary politics had become the politics
of scarcity, not the politics of plenty where everyone could get
something. Consequently, incrementalism as the politics of addition
had moved toward the politics of offsets. Fourth, where Wildavsky
had suggested that budgeting might be a theory of politics and
politics was about who gets what, he now observed that "everyone is
more upfront now. Redistributive purposes, for instance, are now
out in the open." 67
Perhaps as a consequence of this politics of redistribution,
he is also less optimistic that the political and budgetary process
will lead to satisfactory results for minorities. In the 1962
article Wildavsky had suggested that the American political system
works to assure that every significant interest has representation
at some key point. In 1992, Wildavsky said " Did I say that? I must
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have believed it then, I do not now. It is truer, now, I think than
it was then. . . " 68 He then adds " In my opinion, race is far and away
the most important political problem in American life, dwarfing all
others by several orders of magnitude." 69 This is both a more
realistic and more useful appraisal of the budgetary process and
American society. With the half-life of research on budgetary
reform limited to about five years, the staying power of
Wildavsky's original conceptualization is formidable. Wildavsky's
comments on redistributive politics, minorities, and race are
correctives he probably would have made in the original had the
book come out in 1968 and not in 1964.
In testimony before the House Budget Committee in the Spring
of 1992, Wildavsky worried about the reputation of the political
class, "upon which our democracy depends", and suggested the
following budget reforms to help restore the reputation of
policymakers : 70
1. Get rid of the current services budget, because it
convinces everyone that they get not only what they had last year,
but also an inflation adjustment; instead" ... Everybody gets the
outlays that they had; if they want the inflation premium then they
have to come to you (Congress) to get it, and you in your political
wisdom decide how much of that they should get."
2. Replace the notion of entitlement with the notion of quasi
entitlement ... "you are going to get 95% at least of what we
promised, not more than 100%." In this way there would be money




3. Use the pay-as-you go procedure so that new demands are
financed with new revenues or by cutting old programs: "you either
put in a new revenue source or you cut spending elsewhere."
4
.
Connect budget increases to percentage changes in net
national wealth or gross domestic product, with that increase (or
decrease) to be divided up among claimants by the political class.
With these prescriptions, Wildavsky said, interest groups
would not be able " to treat the budget as a one way street; namely
there is always something good for their people and never anything
bad for anyone else. . . .Only in the American political system at the
top is this never-never world allowed where there is only good but
no bad. " 71
Wildavsky suggested that his recommendations would establish
a norm that would not let spending grow faster than national
income, which would be both a growth norm and a ceiling rule. The
limits to growth would make interests compete with one another
through the pay-as-you-go provisions and growth cap, and re-
establish the discipline necessary in the budget process: these
norms-growth and responsibility .. "are designed to make it
worthwhile for program supporters to sacrifice for the common
interest." 72 In the original Politics , it was this assumption of
shared sacrifice that allowed control agencies to hold expenditures
close to revenues and to hold the system of aggressive advocates in
check with controllers who cut.
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Conclusions
Aaron Wildavsky was, as Richard Rose observed "...a real
mensch." 73 Reviewing the breadth of his writing and contribution on
virtually all facets of the politics of budgeting, as a scholar
and teacher Aaron, in fact, was a "real man" for all seasons. He
found opportunity in conducting research and writing on budgeting
and fiscal policy, and he seized it and worked on it until he found
that there was little else he wanted to say. In our view, by the
early 1990s, Aaron and his collaborators had written essentially
everything of seminal significance about the politics and culture
of budgeting that there is to write. This conclusion might have
been drawn by 1975, given the prodigious output and significance of
the work done by Aaron and his collaborators by this time. However,
Wildavsky himself, along with Joseph White and other collaborators
including Carolyn Webber, Dennis Coyle, Michael Dempster, David
Good, and Naomi Caiden and Hugh Heclo in their revisions of the
successful first editions of their books published with Aaron
before 1975, demonstrated that such a conclusion would have been
premature. Certainly, there is plenty of room for future
descriptive work on the emergent budgetary antics, foibles and even
successes of Congress and the President, for analysis of new
proposals for budget reform, for empirical and quantitative
analysis of fiscal policy decisions and their distributive
consequences and the like, but in our view there is not much left
to be said that is new about the dynamics of the politics of
budgeting. We would grant that continued testing of many of the
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hypotheses developed by Aaron and his collaborators should be done,
but Wildavsky's work has defined the territory and it has
established the standards against which future work is to be
judged.
Aaron Wildavsky and his collaborators have explained what
seems to be almost everything there is that is worth knowing about
the politics of budgeting and the cultural stage upon which the
annual political drama of budgeting is played. Wildavsky understood
the essence of power politics and budgetary culture -- the art of
compromise to produce a budget that distributes dissatisfaction
relatively equally over time. And, as demonstrated in his triumphal
work, "A Budget for All Seasons? Why the Traditional Budget Lasts,"
he knew that incrementalism is the inevitable result of the
necessity to forge compromise over taxing and spending policy in
democratic political systems, that incremental change could only
take place slowly, and that slow, incremental change as a steady
diet isn't so bad after all, once you get used to it. He taught us
that it was our expectations and perspective that we needed to
think about more creatively. Thereby, he made us more aware of what
there is to appreciate about the way in which our federal budget
process operates, despite all that we find to complain about, and
this view articulated so effectively in "A Budget for All Seasons?"
has withstood the test of time. Perhaps most fundamentally, from
his first article on the politics of budgeting to the final version
of The New Politics of the Budgetary Process , he provided us with
the key to understanding what we observe --he showed us from which
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perspectives budgets and budgeting could best be analyzed and
comprehended. He demonstrated how to stretch and graft onto what
we already knew the information and perspective to accommodate and
thus enhance our understanding of a budget process that is
characterized by continuous, evolutionary change and attempts at
reform. Within the framework of incrementalism -- toward a radical
incrementalism -- Wildavsky told us what should be done to balance
the budget, how to do it, and how efforts to do it could and should
be evaluated. He lamented the dissensus so evident in the present
compared to the "classical era" of budgeting, but he told us that
the budget process was not the problem but rather, the victim. The
problem, he explained so adroitly, was dissensus over policy in
government and in our society, not budgeting. He argued before
Congress, in his next to last article in Public Administration
Review , "Political Implications of Budget Reform: A Retrospective,
"
and in The New Politics, that better budgeting through expenditure
limits, curbing the growth or even accepting marginal reductions in
entitlements, could become part of the solution -- but these
reforms did not offer the solution. Finding the solution or
solutions to the serious problems faced in this country, alas,
would be much more difficult and more a function of social and
cultural change in America than mere change in the institutional
mechanisms we employ for resource allocation decision making. He
also noted at the end of his writing on budgets that budgeting
under conditions of scarcity may or may not be incremental --
sometimes cuts are not distributed equally and predicated on the
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base, and we should want it to be this way. He argued that in the
end we would have little choice but to accept this view.
However, before Wildavsky taught us about the nature of the
budgetary dilemma, he first taught us the enduring basics about
budgeting that we continue to teach our students. Lest we take for
granted what we now know but once did not and, as a consequence,
neglect to teach our students well, his work is there for us to
use. Thus, to new generations, through us, he will continue to
teach that those agencies and budget advocates who develop and
execute a budgetary strategy, quantifying outputs to the greatest
extent possible and tying measures of accomplishment back to the
previous year's base while cultivating their relationships with
their political masters and budget controllers will, in most cases,
succeed in gaining an ever larger share of the budgetary pie. At
minimum, they may be able to hold onto their base when demand for
their services diminishes. He taught us about the weight and
momentum of "uncontrollables" -- entitlements that bear the stamp
of moral obligation in a society that perceives of itself as moral.
He explored the incentives and disincentives that cause the various
actors in the budgetary process to behave as they do, and he showed
that their behavior is, therefore, rational from a competitive
budgetary policy perspective. None-the-less, he believed that
procedural reform could help move the political process to a
perspective from which better policy could emerge.
Wildavsky was positive about the need for and utility of
procedural reform, e.g., to improve the quality of analysis of
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budgetary issues, to bring knowledge to power, to control the
deficit, to create better balance between the power of the
executive and Congress in fiscal decision making. But, despite his
investment of effort in arguing for reform, he reminded us that no
change in the process of budgeting will alter the essential
character of the budgetary struggle for power and money to spend
on constituent programs. His work reinforces the egalitarian view
that people make a difference in defining the outcomes of the
budget process -- people make decisions according to the rules of
the game. However, the rules can be changed to fit the
circumstances -- substance will inevitably triumph over process.
This is as it should be in a democracy; we should not expect nor
should we want it to be any other way because the outcome where
process dominates substance is the tyranny of the few and,
eventually, the failure of the policy process to address the
legitimate needs of the people.
We may lament the foibles of democratic decision making, but
the alternative to this convoluted and often confusing, disjointed
and highly confrontational method of deciding is far worse than
what we have learned to hate. Congress is continually tired of
"budgeting, budgeting, budgeting," Wildavsky informed us, yet
institutional reform is resisted because it produces winners and
losers. Both the risk averse and the wise in Congress and the
Executive branches of government understand why the devil they know
is better that the one they don't. The budgetary game rewards those
who know the rules and know how to play within them to win. Why
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change the game when you either know how to work the present rules
to your gain, or are fearful that reform will cost whatever power
you have managed to accumulate over time? Incrementalism is safe.
It tends to produce predictable outcomes, and politicians and
budgeteers prefer greater over less certainty. The rewards of the
present typically are sufficient to persuade budgetary process
participants to resist comprehensive change and to be suspicious of
even marginal adjustments.
Reformers laud the miracles that may be achieved by reform,
whether it be PPBS, management and budgeting by objectives,
zero-based budgeting, program-based performance budgeting, deficit
control "no-fault" budgeting, service effort and accomplishments
budgeting or whatever is current. The potential winners and losers
from reform assess their odds and stick with the status quo while
bending slowly with the winds of change, returning straight -up once
each budget storm fad has passed. Amid all of this the real battles
over who gets how much money for what programs and where it will be
spent continues, woven in with whatever procedural experiment is





1. Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budget
Processes , p. xvi . Once I heard a story ... about a learned
gentleman who spent his life studying the organization of post
off ices... I do not intend to follow his example. Sufficient is
enough. This book contains my last original work on contemporary
budget processes.
2. See The Politics of the Budgetary Process . 1964. p. vii.
3. See Chapter Nine in The New Politics of the Budgetary Process .
1988.
4. Aaron Wildavsky, "Political Implications of Budgetary Reform,"
Public Administration Review , 21/4 (Autumn) 1961: pp. 183-190.
5. Aaron Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process ,
2nd edition, 1992, p. ii.
6. "On Wildavsky," Public Affairs Report , Institute of
Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 34/6,
November 1993, p. 14.
7. See for example, Martin Trow, "The Public and Private Lives of
Higher Education," Daedalus , 104, Winter 1975, pp. 113-127.
8. L. R. Jones was a student of Wildavsky' s at Berkeley in the
period 1968 - 1971 and completed his Master's Thesis with Aaron
as his advisor. Wildavsky also advised his doctoral study at
Berkeley from 1973 to 1977.
9. V.O. Key, Jr., "The Lack of Budgetary Theory," American
Political Science Review , 34 (December) 1940, pp. 1137-1144;
Verne B. Lewis, Toward a Theory of Budgeting," Public
Administration Review . 12 (Winter) 1952: pp. 42-54; Arthur
Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States . (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1955)
.
10. Wildavsky, "Political Implications," Wildavsky explained in a
footnote that in fact Key, "...shies away from the implications
of his question and indicates keen awareness of the political
problems involved," p. 190.
11. Ibid .
12. Ibid . , p. 186.
13. Ibid .
14. Ibid
. , p. 187. Wildavsky' s ability to turn a phrase is
legendary. Who for example could resist chuckling at quick lines
such as, "Some butterflies were caught, no elephants stopped,"
that he used to describe the outcomes of zero-based and program
budgeting. He lectured and spoke in the same way -- hitting the
substance of matters on target in a humorous, Jewish-Brooklyn





16. Ibid . , p. 184.
17. Ibid .
18. Ibid., p. 189. In developing this insight Wildavsky thanked
Richard Fenno for loaning him a research proposal . He then
further acknowledged the excellence of Fenno' s research
and writing. There is little doubt that Wildavsky learned a
great deal from Fenno and that Fenno 's research and findings
helped to shape Wildavsky' s view of what research








21. Ibid . p. 190.
22. Ibid
. pp. 189-190.
23. In 1968 Wildavsky explained to an eager graduate student with
the vague notion of eventually pursuing an academic career (here
we paraphrase due to fading memory) , 'Always work on what people
are going to be interested in knowing about in the future ... think
three or five years ahead.. and don't be afraid to criticize ... .you
will know more about what they will be trying to do than they
will .. .nobody will be interested in compliments .. .people want to
know what went wrong, why, whose fault it was and what should be
done about it, so tell them.'
24. Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process ,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964,1974,1979,1984). The New
Politics of The Budgetary Process , (Boston: Scott Foresman and
Co., 1988; NY, NY: Harper Collins, 1992. These will be cited as
'Politics' and 'New Politics' hereafter.
25. See Herbert Simon, Models of Man (New York, 1957); Richard
Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of The Firm (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1963.); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of
Decision Making in a Democracy. (New York, 1955)
.
26. Charles Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through" Public
Administration Review, vol. XIX, Spring 1959. pp. 79-88.
27. Wildavsky, Politics , 1964. p. 148. During his graduate years
at Yale, Wildavsky had taken a course from Lindblom while
Lindblom was making the intellectual journey from economics
toward the science of muddling through.
28. Wildavsky, Politics , 1964. p. 178.
29. Ibid.
30. Wildavsky, Politics , 1964. 179.
31. Wildavsky, Politics , 1964. pp. 64-65. Friend and colleague
Nelson Polsby related recently, " I told him not to publish it,
for two reasons. First, it did not explain when specific
budgetary strategies were used and not used, and when they worked
and didn't work. Second, it didn't cover the revolution in the
Defense Department with McNamara's institution of PPBS and
systems analysis." Polsby recounted Aaron's blunt response, "To
Hell with you. It's better than anything else out there now and I
am going to publish it. " Polsby conceded that Aaron was right
that it was the best thing written at that time, but did not give
in on his two points. The book was a success, of course, and
Aaron tried to fill the gaps and correct the deficiencies pointed
out to him by Polsby and other colleagues. As it turned out, this
took a long time to do; The new Politics did not appear until
1988. Furthermore, Wildavsky never did completely satisfy
Polsby's first criterion. . .and neither has anyone else to our
knowledge. The definitive study of contingent strategy in
budgeting has yet to be written in our opinion.
32. Wildavsky, Politics , 1964. pp. vii.
33 .Wildavsky, New Politics , p. xxvii.
34. Wildavsky, Politics , 1974. pp. xx-xxi.
35. Wildavsky, Politics , 1974. pp. xii-xiii.
36. Wildavsky, Politics , 1984. p. 254.
37. Wildavsky, Politics 1984. p. 279.
38. Wildavsky, Politics . 1984, p. xv.
39. Wildavsky, Politics , 1984. p. xxviii.
40. Wildavsky, Politics , 1984. p. xi
.
41. Wildavsky, New Politics , 1988. p. 439.
42. Ibid.
43. Wildavsky, New Politics , 1992. p. 526.
44. Wildavsky, Politics , 1964. pp. 47-56; New Politics . 1988, pp.
95-100. On page 72 of the New Politics , Wildavsky is careful to
warn readers "This chapter is about the routine business or a
bygone age .
"
45. Wildavsky, New Politics , 1988. p. 161.
46. Wildavsky, New Politics , 1988, p. 181.
47. Wildavsky, New Politics , 1988. p. 173.
48. Wildavsky, New Politics , 1988. pp. 172-173.
49. Wildavsky, New Politics , 1992. pp. xv-xvi.
50. Wildavsky, New Politics , 1992. p. xi
.
51. Wildavsky, Politics . 1964. p. 4.
52. Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB : The Stages of Budget Reform,"
Public Administration Review , 26/4 (December) 1966, p. 258.
Wildavsky described this article as, "An excellent discussion of
different purposes of budgeting and stages of budgetary
development." See "Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS," Public
Administration Review , 29/2, 1969, p. 202 (footnote 18).
53. Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost
Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting,"
Public Administration Review , 26/4 (December) 1966, pp. 309-310.
54. Aaron Wildavsky, "Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS," Public
Administration Review , 29/2, 1969, pp. 189-191.







58. Richard Rose, "Professor Aaron Wildavsky," London: The
Independent , October 9, 1993.
59. Wildavsky, Budgeting, p. 155.
60. Rose, op. cit .
61. Aaron Wildavsky, "Toward a Radical Incrementalism: A Proposal
to Aid Congress in Reform of the Budgetary Process," in Congress
:
The First Branch of Government , (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1966), pp. 115-165.
62. Wildavsky, Budgeting, pp. 402-403.
63. Wildavsky, How to Control," p. 58.
64. Wildavsky, How to Control," p. 126. The book concludes with
comments on the constitutional limit by a subcommittee of The
National Tax Limitation Committee, William Niskanen, Naomi
Caiden, Carolyn Webber. See in particular Niskanen' s alternative
and Caiden' s analysis of problems in implementing government
expenditure limitations. For a comprehensive statement of the
arguments supporting a balanced budget, uncontrollables, and
spending ceilings, see Aaron Wildavsky, "Introduction: Toward a
New Budgetary Order," in Michael J. Boskin and Aaron Wildavsky,
eds
.
, The Federal Budget: Economics and Politics , (San Francisco,
CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1982), pp. 3-20.
65. White and Wildavsky, The Deficit , p. 575.
66. Aaron Wildavsky. "Political Implication of Budget Reform"
Public Administration Review , 1992. vol. 52 no. 6. pp. 594-603.
67. Ibid., p. 597.
68. Ibid., p. 596.
69. Ibid., p. 596.
70. Aaron Wildavsky, "Norms and Rules to Facilitate Convergence
on Budget Balance," Public Administration Review 1993. vol 53 no.
1. pp. 28-30.
71. Wildavsky, "Norms and Rules" 1993. p. 29.
72. Wildavsky, "Norms and Rules", 1993. p. 30.
73. Richard Rose, "Aaron Wildavsky," The Independent , October 9,
1993.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON BUDGETING
Books
The New Politics of Budgetary Process . 2nd edition. New York:
Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.
The Deficit and the Public Interest (with Joseph White) . Berkeley:
University of California Press, co-published with the Russell
Sage Foundation, 1990.
A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World (with
Carolyn Webber) . Simon and Schuster, 1986.
How to Limit Government Spending . Los Angeles/Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980.
The Private Government of Public Money (with Hugh Heclo) . 2nd
Edition. London: Macmmillan, 1981.
The Politics of the Budgetary Process . 4th Edition.
Boston:Little, Brown, 1984.
Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary processes . Boston:
Little, Brown, 1975. A revised second ed. , Transaction
Publishers, 1986.
Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries (with Naomi Caiden) . New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974. Paperback edition by Transaction,
Inc., New Brunswick, NJ, 1980.
The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or
Money Doesn't Grow on Trees (with Jeanne Nienaber) . New York:
Basic Books, 1973.
Articles
"Norms and Rules to Facilitate Convergence on Budget Balance,
"
Public Administration Review , Vol. 53, no. 1 (January/February
1993)
, pp. 28-30.
"Political Implications of Budget Reform: A Retrospective,
"
Public Administration Review , vol. 52 , no. 6 (November/December
1992)
, pp. 594-603.
"How To Fix the Def icit--Really" (with Joseph White)
.
The Public




"Public Authority and the Public Interest: What the 1980s Budget
Battles Tell Us about the American State" (with Joseph White)
,
Journal of Theoretical Politics , vol.1, no. 1 (January 198 9), pp.7
-
31.
"A Cultural Theory of Budgeting, " International Journal of Public




If you Can't Budget, How Can You Govern?" in Annelise Anderson
and Dennis L. Bark, eds
.
, thinking about America: The United




"On the Balance of Budgetary Cultures, " in Ralph Clark Chandler,




"Requisites of Radical Reform: Income Maintenance versus Tax
Preferences" (with Dennis Coyle)
.
Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management , Vol.7, No.KFall 1987)
, pp. 1-16 .
"Keeping Kosher: The Epistemology of Tax Expenditures ,
"
Journal of
Public Pol icy , Vol. 5, No. 3 (1986)
,
pp. 413 -31.
"A Cultural Theory of Expenditure Growth and (Un) Balanced
Budgets,
"
Journal of Public Economics .vol .28, (1985)
,
pp. 349-57.
"Item Veto without a Global Spending Limit: Locking the Treasury
after the Dollars Have Fled,
"
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics
and Public Policy , vol .1, no. 2 (1985)
,
pp. 165-176.
"Equality, Spending Limits, and the Growth of Government," in C.
Lowell Harriss, ed.
,
Control of Federal Spending , Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science, vol . 35, no . 4 (1985) : 59-71
.
"Budgets as Social Orders ,
"
Research in Urban Policy , vol.1
(1985) :pp. 183-97.
"The Transformation of Budgetary Norms ,
"
Australian Journal of
Public Administration , vol . XLI I , no . 4 (December 1983) : 421-32
.
"From Chaos Comes Opportunity: the movement toward spending
limits in American and Canadian budgeting,
"
Canadian Public
Administration , vol .26, no. 2 (Summer 1983) :163-181.
"Modelling the U.S. Federal Spending Process: Overview and




The Grants Economy and Collective
Consumption (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983)
,
pp. 267-309 .
"The Budget as New Social Contract ,
"
Journal of Contemporary
Studies, vol. 5, no. 2 (Spring 1982):3-20.
"Introduction: Toward a New Budgetary Order, "in Micheal J. Boskin
and Aaron Wildavsky, eds. The Federal Budget (San Francisco:
Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1982) ,pp . 3-20
.
"Budgets as Compromises among Social Orders, "in The Federal
Budget, pp. 21-38
.
"Budgetary Futures: why Politicians May Want Spending Limits in
Turbulent Times ,
"
Public Budgeting and Finance .vol . 1 . no. 1 (Spring
1981) :20-27.
"Is Expenditure Limitation Possible without a Constitutional
Amendment?" The Congressional Budget Process: Some Views from the
Inside , publication no. 32, July 1980, Proceedings of a conference
cosponsored by the Center for the Study of American Business and
the Department of Political Science, Washington University, St.
Louis, Missouri, February 22-23, 1980.
"Why Amending the Constitution is Essential to Achieving Self-
Control through Self -Limitation of Expenditure," The Bureaucrat ,
vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 48-53.
"Limiting Government Expenditure by Constitutional Amendment,: in
Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton, eds
.
, Making Bureaucracies
Work (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980)
.
"Using Public Funds to Serve Private Interests," Society , vol.
16, no. 2 (Jan/Feb 1979): 39-42.
"Budgetary Reform in an Age of Big Government," in Thomas Vocino
and Jack Rabin, eds., Contemporary Public Administration , (New
York: Harcourt , Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1981), pp. 261-91.
"A Budget for All Seasons? Why the Traditional Budget Lasts," The
Public Administration Review , no. 6 (Nov/Dec 1978): 501-509. Also
in State Audit: Developments in Public Accountability , B. Geist,
ed (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 253-68.
"On Change... or, There Is No Magic Size for an Increment" (with
M.A.H. Dempster), Political Studies , vol. 27, no. 3 (September
1979) : 371-89.
"A Tax by Any Other Name: The Donor Directed Automatic Percentage
Contribution Bonus, a Budget Alternative for Alternative for
Financing Government Support of Charity" (with David A. Good)
,
Policy Sciences , vol. 7 (1976): 251-79.
"Towards a Predictive Theory of Government Expenditure: U.S>
Domestic Appropriations" (with Otto Davis and M.A.H. Dempster,
British Journal of Political Science , vol. 4 (1974)
.
"The Annual Expenditure Increment --or How Congress Can Regain
Control of the Budget," The Public Interest , no. 33 (Fall 19973):
84-108; also cited as "The Annual Expenditure Increment," Working
Papers on House Committee Organization and Operation , Select
Committee on Committees, U.S. House of Representatives.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, June 1973).
"On the Process of Budgeting II: An Empirical Study of
Congressional Appropriations" (with Otto A. Davis and M.A.H.
Dempster), Studies in Budgeting , Byrne et al
.
, eds. (Amsterdam-
London: North-Holland Publishing, 1971), pp. 292-375.
"Leave City Budgeting Alone! A Survey, Case History and
Recommendations for Reform" (with Arnold Meltsner) , Financing the
Metropolis: The Role of Public Policy in Urban Economies , vol.4.
John P. Crecine and Louis H. Masotti, eds . (Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1970), pp. 311-58.
"Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS, " Public Administration
Review , vol. 29, no. 2 (March/ April 1969): 189-202.
"Budgeting as a Political Process," in The International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences , David L. Sills, ed., vol. 2
(New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan, 1968), pp. 192-99.
"The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting, " Public Administration
Review , vol. 26, no. 4 (Dec 1966): 292-310.
"On the Process of Budgeting: An Empirical Study of Congressional
Appropriation" (with Otto A. Davis and M.A.H. Dempster) . In
Papers on Non-Market Decision Making , Gordon Tullock, ed.
(Charlottesville: Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy,
Univ. of Virginia, 1966), pp. 63-132.
"A Theory of the Budgetary Process," with Otto Davis and M.A.H.
Dempster, American Political Science Review , vol. 60, no. 3 (Sept
1966) : pp. 529-47.
"Toward a Radical Incrementalism: A Proposal to Aid Congress in
Reform of the Budgetary Process, " Congress: The First Branch of
Government (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1966), pp.
115-65.
"Comprehensive versus Incremental Budgeting in the Department of
Agriculture" (with Arthur Hammond) , Administrative Science
Quarterly , vol.10, no. 3 (Dec 1965): pp. 321-46.
"Political Implications of Budgetary Reform, " Public
Administration Review , vol. 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1961): pp. 183-90.
Distribution List
Agency No. of Copies
Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
Dudley Knox Library, Code 52
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
Library, Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Ave.
Alexandria, VA 22302-0268
Department of the Navy
Office of the Comptroller
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20001








Jerry McCaffery, Code AS/Mm
Naval Postgraduate School
555 Dyer Rd.
Monterey, CA 93943



DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
liiiiii
